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Abstract. We implement two versions of a simple but illustrative smart
contract: one in Solidity on the Ethereum blockchain platform, and one
in Plutus on the Cardano platform, with annotated code excerpts and
with source code attached. We get a clearer view of the Cardano pro-
gramming model in particular by introducing a novel mathematical ab-
straction which we call Idealised EUTxO. For each version of the con-
tract, we trace how the architectures of the underlying platforms and
their mathematics affects the natural programming styles and natural
classes of errors. We prove some simple but novel results about alpha-
conversion and observational equivalence for Cardano, and explain why
Ethereum does not have them. We conclude with a wide-ranging and de-
tailed discussion in the light of the examples, mathematical model, and
mathematical results so far.
1 Introduction
In the context of blockchain and cryptocurrencies, smart contracts are a way to
make the blockchain programmable. That is: a smart contract is a program that
runs on the blockchain to extend its capabilities.
For the smart contract, the blockchain is just an abstract machine (database,
if we prefer) with which it programmatically interacts. Basic design choices in
the blockchain’s design can affect the the smart contract programming paradigm
which it naturally supports, and this can have far-reaching consequences: differ-
ent programming paradigms are susceptible to different programming styles, and
different kinds of program errors.
Thus, a decision in the blockchain’s design can have lasting, unavoidable,
and critical effects on its programmability. It is worth being very aware of how
this can play out, not least because almost by definition, applications of smart-
contracts-the-programming-paradigm tend to be safety-critical.
In this paper we will consider a simple but illustrative example of a smart
contract: a fungible tradable token issued by an issuer who creates an initial
supply and then retains control of its price—imitating a government-issued fiat
currency, but run from a blockchain instead of a central bank.
We will put this example in the context of two major smart contract lan-
guages: Solidity, which runs on the Ethereum blockchain, whose native token is
ether ; and Plutus, which runs on the Cardano blockchain, whose native token
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is ada.3 We compare and contrast the blockchains in detail and exhibit their
respective smart contracts. Both contracts run, but their constructions are dif-
ferent, in ways that illuminate the essential natures of the respective underlying
blockchains and the programming styles that they support.
We will also see that the Ethereum smart contract is arguably buggy, in a way
that flows from the underlying programming paradigm of Solidity/Ethereum. So
even in a simple example, the essential natures of the underlying systems are
felt, and with a mission-critical impact.
Definition 1.1. We will use Solidity and Plutus to code a system as follows:
1. An issuer Issuer creates some initial supply of a tradable token on the
blockchain at some location in Issuer’s control; call this the official portal.
2. Other parties buy the token from the official portal at a per-token ether/ada
official price, controlled by the issuer.4
Once other parties get some token, they can trade it amongst themselves
(e.g. for ether/ada), independently of the official portal and on whatever
terms and at whatever price they mutually agree.
3. The issuer can update the ether/ada official price of the token on the official
portal, at any time.
4. For simplicity, we permit just one initial issuance of the token, though tokens
can be redistributed as just described.
2 Idealised EUTxO
2.1 The structure of an idealised blockchain
We start with a novel mathematical idealisation of the EUTxO (Extended UTxO)
model on which Cardano is based [1, 2].
Notation 2.1. Suppose X and Y are sets. Then:
1. Write N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} and N>0 = {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
2. Write fin(X) for the finite powerset of X and fin !(X) for the pointed finite
powerset (the (X ′, x) ∈ fin(X)×X such that x ∈ X ′).5
3. Write pow (X) for the powerset of X , and X
fin
⇀ Y for finite maps from X to
Y (finite partial functions).
Definition 2.2. Let the types of Idealised EUTxO be a solution to the
equations in Figure 1.6 For diagrams and examples see Example 2.6.
3 Plutus and Cardano are IOHK designs. The CEO and co-founder of IOHK, Charles
Hoskinson, was also one of the co-founders of Ethereum.
4 Think: central bank, manufacturer’s price, official exchange rate, etc.
5 This use of ‘pointed’ is unrelated to the ‘points to’ of Notation 2.4.
6 We write ‘a solution of’ because Figure 1 does not specify a unique subset for
Validator. Computable subsets is one candidate, but our mathematical abstraction is
agnostic to this choice. This is just the same as function-types not being modelled
by all functions, or indeed as models of set theory can have different powersets (e.g.
depending on whether a powerset includes the Axiom of Choice).
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Redeemer = CurrencySymbol = TokenName = Position = N
Chip = CurrencySymbol × TokenName
Datum× Value = N × (Chip
fin
⇀ N>0)
Validator ⊆ pow (Redeemer× Datum× Value× Context)
Input = Position × Redeemer
Output = Position × Validator× Datum× Value
Transaction = fin(Input)× fin(Output)
Context = fin
!
(Input)× fin(Output)
Fig. 1. Types for Idealised EUTxO
1 data Chip =MkChip
2 { cSymbol :: !CurrencySymbol
3 , cName :: !TokenName }
4
5 data Config =MkConfig
6 { cIssuer :: !PubKeyHash
7 , cTradedChip, cStateChip :: !Chip }
8
9 tradedChip :: Config → Integer → Value
10 tradedChip MkConfig{..} n = singletonValue cTradedChip n
11
12 data Action =
13 SetPrice ! Integer
14 | Buy ! Integer
15
16 transition :: Config → State Integer → Action
17 → Maybe (TxConstraints Void Void, State Integer )
18 transition c s (SetPrice p) – ACTION: set price to p
19 | p <0 = Nothing – p negative? ignore!
20 | otherwise = Just – otherwise
21 ( mustBeSignedBy (cIssuer c) – issuer signed?
22 , s{stateData =p}) – set new price!
23 transition c s (Buy m) – ACTION: buy m chips
24 | m ≤ 0 = Nothing – buy negative quantity? ignore!
25 | otherwise = Just – otherwise
26 ( mustPayToPubKey (cIssuer c) value’ – issuer been paid?
27 , s{stateValue = stateValue s − sold}) – sell chips!
28 where
29 value ’ = lovelaceValueOf (m ∗ stateData s) – final value buyer pays
30 sold = tradedChip c m – no. chips buyer gets
31
32 guarded :: HasNative s ⇒ Config → Integer → Integer
33 → Contract s Text ()
34 guarded c n maxPrice =
35 void $ withError $ runGuardedStep (client c) (Buy n) $
36 λ p → if p ≤ maxPrice then Nothing else Just ()
Fig. 2. Plutus implementation of the tradable token
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Remark 2.3. 1. Think of r ∈ Redeemer as a key, required as a necessary
condition by a validator (below) to permit computation.
2. A chip c = (d, n) is intuitively a currency unit (£, $, . . . ), where d ∈
CurrencySymbol is assumed to Go¨del encode7 some predicate defining amon-
etary policy (more on this in Remark 2.8(2)) and n ∈ TokenName is just a
symbol (Ada has special status and is encoded as (0, 0)).
3. Datum is any data; we set it to be N for simplicity. A value v ∈ Value is
intuitively a multiset of tokens; v c is the number of cs in v.
– We may abuse notation and define v c = 0 if c 6∈ dom(v).
– If dom(v) = {c} then we may call v a singleton value (note v c need
not equal 1). See line 10 of Figure 2 for the corresponding code.
4. A transaction is a set of inputs and a set of outputs (either of which may be
empty). In a blockchain these are subject to consistency conditions (Defini-
tion 2.5); for now we just say its inputs ‘consume’ some previous outputs,
and ‘generate’ new outputs. A context is just a transaction viewed from a
particular input (see next item).
5. Mathematically a validator V ∈ Validator is the set of Redeemer × Datum×
Value× Transaction tuples it validates but in the implementation we intend
that V is represented by code V such that
– from V we cannot efficiently compute a tuple t such that V(t)=True, and
– from V and t, we can efficiently check if V(t)=True.8
We use a pointed transaction (Notation 2.1(2)) because a Validator in an
Output in a Transaction is always invoked by some particular Input in a later
Transaction (see Definition 2.5(2&3)), and that invoking input is identified
by using Context. If t ∈ V then we say V validates t.
Notation 2.4. 1. If tx = (I, O) ∈ Transaction and o ∈ Output, say o appears
in tx and write o ∈ tx when o ∈ O; similarly for an input i ∈ Input. We may
silently extend this notation to larger data structures, writing for example
o ∈ Txs (Definition 2.9(1)).
2. If i and o have the same position then say that i points to o.
3. If tx = (I, O) ∈ Transaction and i ∈ I then write tx@i for the context
((I, i), O) obtained by pointing I at i ∈ I.
Definition 2.5. A valid blockchain, or just blockchain, of idealised EUTxO
is a finite sequence of transactions Txs such that:
1. Distinct outputs appearing in Txs have distinct positions.
2. Every input i in some tx in Txs points to a unique output in some earlier
transaction — it follows from this and condition 1 of this Definition, that
distinct inputs appearing in Txs also have distinct positions.
Write this unique output Txs(i).
3. If i = (p, k) appears in tx in Txs and points to an earlier output Txs(i) =
(p, V, s, v), then (k, s, tx@i) ∈ V (@ from Notation 2.4(3)).
7 Go¨del encoding refers to the idea of enumerating a countable datatype (in some
arbitrary way) so that each element is represented by a unique numerical index.
8 The ‘crypto’ in ‘cryptocurrency’ lives here.
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tx
(a, r1)
(b, r2)
(c, r3)
(d, V1, d1, v1)
(e, V2, d2, v2)
Fig. 3. A transaction tx with three inputs and two outputs, positions a, b, c, d, e, re-
deemers ri, validators Vj , data dj and values vj
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Fig. 4. A blockchain B = [tx 1, tx 2, tx 3, tx4]
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Fig. 5. B chopped up as a blockchain [tx 1, tx 2] and a chunk [tx 3, tx 4]
tx 1 tx 2tx 3 tx 4
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Fig. 6. B chopped up as a blockchain [tx 1, tx 3] and a chunk [tx 2, tx 4]
tx 1 tx 2tx 3 tx 4
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Fig. 7. The blockchain B′ = [tx 1, tx 3, tx 2, tx 4]
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Example 2.6. Example transactions, blockchains, and chunks are illustrated in
Figures 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.
We leave it as an exercise to the reader to verify that: B, B′, [tx1, tx2] and
[tx1, tx3] are blockchains; and [tx ], [tx 3, tx4] and [tx2, tx4] are chunks but not
blockchains. Also, e.g. [tx2, tx1] is neither blockchain nor chunk, though it is a
list of transactions, because the b-input of tx2 points to the later b-output of tx1.
Notation 2.7. Txs will range over finite sequences of transactions, and B will
range over blockchains.We write valid (Txs) for the assertion “Txs is a blockchain”.
Remark 2.8. In words: A sequence of transactions is a blockchain when every
input points to an earlier validating output. Note that output and inputs of a
transaction may be empty, and this matters because any blockchain must contain
a so-called genesis block, which is a transaction without inputs. We call Figure 1
and Definition 2.5 Idealised EUTxO because:
1. The implementation has bells and whistles which we omit for simplicity:
(a) There is a second type of output for making payments to people.
(b) Values represent ‘real money’ and so are preserved—the sum of input
values must be equal to the sum of output values—unless they are not
preserved, e.g. due to fees (which reduce the sum of outputs) or forging
(creating) tokens (which increase it).
(c) Transactions can be made time-sensitive using slot ranges (Remark 2.18);
a transaction can only be accepted into a block whose slot is inside the
transaction’s slot range.
All of the above is important for a working blockchain but for our purposes
it would just add complexity.
2. We continue the discussion in Remark 2.3(2). If we consider a chip c = (d, n),
the currency symbol d is not aritrary: it is (a Go¨del encoding of) a monetary
policy predicate. In the implementation, only transactions which satisfy all
pertinent monetary policies are admissible.
This is relevant to our example in Section 3 because we will assume a state
chip with a monetary policy which enforces that it is affine (zero or one chips
on the blockchain; see Remark 3.3). Explaining the mechanics of how this
works is outside the scope of this paper; here we just note it exists.
3. In the implementation, a transaction is a pair of a set of inputs and a list of
outputs. This is because an implementation concerns a run on a particular
concrete blockchain B, and we want to assign concrete positions for outputs
in B; so with a list the output located at the jth output of ith transaction
could get position 2i3j .
However, we care here about the theory of blockchains (plural). It is better
to use sets and leave positions abstract, since if positions are fixed by their
location in a blockchain then in Theorem 2.17 and the lemmas leading up to
it, when we rearrange transactions in a blockchain (e.g. proving an observa-
tional equivalence) we could have to track an explicit reindexing of positions
in the statement of the results. More on this in Subsection 2.3.
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2.2 UTxOs and observational equivalence
We will be most interested in Definition 2.9 when Txs and Txs ′ are blockchains
B and B′. However, it is convenient for Lemma 2.15(1) if we consider the more
general case of any finite sequences of transactions Txs and Txs ′:
Definition 2.9. 1. Call an output o ∈ Txs spent (in Txs) when a later input
points to it, and otherwise call o unspent (in Txs).
2. Write UTxO(Txs) for the set of unspent outputs in Txs.
3. If UTxO(Txs) = UTxO(Txs ′) then write Txs ≈ Txs ′ and call Txs and Txs ′
observationally equivalent.
Notation 2.10. Given Txs and a tx , write Txs ; tx for the sequence of trans-
actions obtained by appending tx to Txs . We will mostly care about this when
Txs and Txs ; tx are blockchains, and if so this will be clear from context.
Lemma 2.11. Validity (Definition 2.5) is closed under initial subsequences, but
not necessarily under final subsequences:
1. valid(Txs ; tx) implies valid (Txs).
2. valid(tx ;Txs) does not necessarily imply valid(Txs).
Proof. For part 1: removing tx cannot invalidate the conditions in Definition 2.5.
For part 2: it may be that an input in Txs points to an output in tx ; if we then
remove tx we would violate condition 2 of Definition 2.5 that every input must
point to a previous output.
A special case of interest is when two transactions operate on non-overlapping
parts of the preceding blockchain:
Notation 2.12. Suppose tx and tx ′ are transactions. Write tx#tx ′ when the
positions mentioned in the inputs and outputs of tx , are disjoint from those
mentioned in tx ′, and in this case call tx and tx ′ apart. Similarly for tx#Txs .
Lemma 2.13. tx#tx ′ ⇐⇒ tx ′#tx .
Proof. An easy structural fact.
Remark 2.14. In Lemma 2.15 and Theorem 2.17 below, note that:
– valid(B; tx) (Notations 2.7 and 2.10) can be read as the assertion “it is valid
to append the transaction tx to the blockchain B”.
– valid(B;Txs) can be read as “it is valid to extend B with Txs”.
– If tx#tx ′ then they mention disjoint sets of positions, so they cannot point
to one another and the UTxOs they point to are guaranteed distinct.
Lemma 2.15. 1. If tx#tx ′ then we have valid (B; tx ; tx ′) ⇐⇒ valid(B; tx ′; tx)
and B; tx ; tx ′ ∼= B; tx ′; tx .9 Intuitively: if two transactions are apart then it
is valid to commute them.
9 We don’t necessarily know B; tx ; tx ′ is a blockchain, which is why we stated Defini-
tion 2.9 for sequences of transactions.
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2. If valid (B; tx ′; tx) then valid(B; tx)⇐⇒ tx#tx ′. (Some real work happens in
this technical result, and we use this work to prove Theorem 2.17.)
Proof. 1. By routine checking Definition 2.5.
2. Suppose ¬(tx#tx ′), so some position p is mentioned by tx and tx ′. If p is
in an input in both tx and tx ′, or an output in both, then valid(B; tx ′; tx)
is impossible because each input must point to a unique earlier output, and
each output must have a unique position. If p is in an input in tx and an out-
put in tx ′ then ¬valid (B; tx), because now this input points to a nonexistent
output. If p is in an output in tx and an input in tx ′ then valid (B; tx ′; tx) is
impossible, since each input must point to an earlier output.
Conversely suppose tx#tx ′. Then tx ′ must point only to outputs in B and
removing tx cannot disconnect them and so cannot invalidate the conditions
in Definition 2.5.
Remark 2.16. Theorem 2.17 below gives a sense in which UTxO-based ac-
counting is ‘stateless’. With the machinery we now have the proof looks simple,
but this belies its significance, which we now unpack in English:
Suppose we submit tx to some blockchain B. Then either the submission of
tx fails and is rejected (e.g. if some validator objects to it)—or it succeeds and
tx is appended to B.
If it succeeds, then even if other transactions Txs get appended first—e.g.
they were submitted by other actors whose transactions arrived first, so that
in-between us creating tx and the arrival of tx at the main blockchain, it grew
from B to B;Txs—then the result B;Txs; tx is up to observational equivalence
equivalent to B; tx ;Txs, which is what would have happened if our tx had arrived
at B instantly and before the competing transactions Txs.
In other words: if we submit tx to the blockchain, then at worst, other actors’
actions might prevent tx from getting appended, however, if our transaction gets
onto the blockchain somewhere, then we obtain our originally intended result up
to observational equivalence.
Theorem 2.17. Suppose valid (B;Txs; tx) and valid (B; tx). Then
1. valid(B; tx ;Txs) and
2. B; tx ;Txs ∼= B;Txs; tx .
Proof. Using Lemma 2.15(2) tx#Txs . The rest follows using Lemma 2.15(1).
Remark 2.18. The Cardano implementation has slot ranges (Remark 2.8(1c)).
These introduce a notion of time-sensitivity to transactions which breaks Theo-
rem 2.17(1), because Txs might be time-sensitive. If we enrich Idealised EUTxO
with slot ranges then a milder form of the result holds which we sketch as Propo-
sition 2.19 below.
Proposition 2.19. If we extend our blockchains with slot ranges, which restrict
validity of transactions to defined time intervals, then Theorem 2.17 weakens to:
If valid (B; tx ;Txs) and valid (B;Txs; tx) then B; tx ;Txs ∼= B;Txs; tx .
Proof. As for Theorem 2.17, noting that slot ranges are orthogonal to UTxOs,
provided the transactions concerned can be appended.
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2.3 α-equivalence and more on observational equivalence
Our syntax for B in Definition 2.5 is name-carrying; outputs are identified by
unique markers which—while taken from N; see “Position=N”in Figure 1—are
clearly used as atoms or names to identify binding points on the blockchain, to
which at most one later input may bind. Once bound this name can be thought
of graphically as an edge from an output to the input that spends it, so clearly
the choice of name/position—once it is bound—is irrelevant up to permuting
our choices of names. This is familiar from α-equivalence in syntax, where e.g.
λa.λb.ab is equivalent to λb.λa.ba. We define:
Definition 2.20. 1. Write B =α B
′ and call B and B′ α-equivalent when
they differ only in their choice of positions of spent output-input pairs (Def-
inition 2.9(1)).10 It is a fact that this is an equivalence relation.
2. If Φ is an assertion about blockchains, write “up to α-equivalence, Φ” for the
assertion “there exist α-equivalent forms of the arguments of Φ such that Φ
is true of those arguments”.
Lemma 2.21 checks that observational equivalence interacts well with being
a valid blockchain and appending transactions. We sketch its statement and its
proof, which is by simple checking. In words it says: extensionally, a blockhain
up to α-equivalence is just its UTxOs :
Lemma 2.21. 1. B∼=B′ ∧ valid(B; tx) ∧ valid(B′; tx) implies B; tx∼=B′; tx .
2. If B =α B
′ then B ∼= B′.
3. Up to α-equivalence, if B ∼= B′ then valid(B; tx)⇐⇒ valid (B′; tx).
4. Up to α-equivalence, if B ∼= B′ ∧ valid(B; tx) then B; tx ∼= B′; tx .
Remark 2.22. We need α-conversion in cases 3 and 4 of Lemma 2.21 because
valid(B; tx) might fail due to accidental name-clash between the position as-
signed to a spent output in B, and a position in an unspent output of tx . We
need α-conversion to rename the bound position and avoid this name-clash.
This phenomenon is familiar from syntax, e.g. we know to α-convert a in
(λa.b)[b:=a] to obtain (up to α-equivalence) λa′.a.
There are many approaches to α-conversion: graphs, de Bruijn indexes [4],
name-carrying syntax with an equivalence relation as required (used in this pa-
per), the nominal abstract syntax of the second author and others [5], and the
type-theoretic approach in [6]. Studying what works best for a structural theory
of blockchains is future research.
In this paper we have used raw name-carrying syntax, possibly quotiented
by equivalence as above; a more sophisticated development might require more.
Note the implementation solution discussed in Remark 2.8(3) corresponds to a
de Bruijn index approach, and for our needs in this paper, this does not solve
all problems, as discussed in that Remark (see ‘messy reindexing’).
10 Positions of unspent outputs (UTxOs) cannot be permuted. If we permute a UTxO
position in B, we obtain a blockchain B′ with a symmetric equivalence to B but not
observationally equivalent to it (much as -i relates to i in C). More on this in [3].
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3 The Plutus smart contract
Definition 3.1. Relevant parts of the Plutus code to implement Definition 1.1
are in Figure 2. Full source is at https://arxiv.org/src/2003.14271/anc.
Remark 3.2. 1. Chip corresponds to Chip from Figure 1.
2. Config stores configuration: the issuer (given by a hash of their public key),
the chip traded, and the state chip (see Remark 3.3).
3. tradedChip packages up n of cTradedChip in a value (think: a roll of quarters).
4. Action is a datatype which stores labels of a transition system, which in our
case are either ‘buy’ or ‘set price’.
5. State Integer corresponds to Datum in Figure 1. stateData s on line 29 re-
trieves this datum and uses it as the price of the token.
6. value ’ (lines 26 and 29) is the amount of ada paid to the Issuer.11
Remark 3.3 (State chip). In Remark 2.16 we described in what sense Ide-
alised EUTxO (Figure 1) is stateless. Yet Definition 1.1(3) specifies that Issuer
can set a price for the traded chip. This is seems stateful. How to reconcile this?
We create a state chip cStateChip, whose monetary policy (Remark 2.8(2))
enforces that it is affine and monotone increasing, and thus linear once created.
The Issuer issues an initial transaction to the blockchain which sets up our
trading system, and creates a unique UTxO that contains this state chip in its
value, with the price in its Datum field.
The UTxO with the state chip corresponds to the official portal from Defi-
nition 1.1, and its state datum corresponds to the official price.
Monetary policy ensures this is now an invariant of the blockchain as it
develops, and anybody can check the current price by looking up the unique
UTxO distinguished by carrying precisely on cStateChip, and looking at the value
in its Datum field.12 The interested reader can consult the source code.
Remark 3.4 (Expressivity of off-chain code). The Plutus contract is a
state machine, whose transition function transition is compiled into a Validator
function, and so is explicitly on-chain. The function guarded lives off-chain; e.g.
in the user’s wallet. It can construct and send a Buy-transaction to (a UTxO
with the relevant validator on) the blockchain, after checking that the price is
acceptable.
If accepted, the effect of this transaction is independant of concurrent actions
of other users, in senses we have made mathematically precise (cf. Remarks 2.16
and 4.4). This gives Plutus off-chain code a power that Solidity off-chain code
cannot attain.
11 We call it value because it directly corresponds with msg.value in Figure 9, whose
name is fixed in Solidity. We add a dash to avoid name-clash with value, an existing
function from the Plutus Ledger library.
12 This technique was developed by the IOHK Plutus team.
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4 The Solidity smart contract
4.1 Description
Remark 4.1. The Ethereum blockchain is account-based: it can be thought of
as a state machine whose transitions modify a global state of contracts containing
functions and data. We propose in Figure 8 a type presentation of Idealised
Ethereum, parallel to the Idealised EUTxO of Figure 1. In brief:
1. Sender, Address, and Value are natural numbers N. Datum is intended to be
structured data which we Go¨del encode for convenience. FunctionName and
ContractName are names, which again for simplicity we encode as N.
2. A contract has a name and a finite set of functions (Notation 2.1(2)).
3. A function has a name and maps an input to a blockchain transformer.
4. A blockchain is a finite collection of contracts, to each of which is assigned
a state of a value (a balance of ether) and some structured data. We intend
that a valid blockchain satisfy some consistency conditions, including that
each contract in it have a distinct name.
Thus the contract Changing (line 1 of Figure 9), once deployed, is located on the
Ethereum blockchain, with its functions and state. This contract and its state
are ‘in one place’ on the blockchain; not spread out across multiple UTxOs as
in Cardano. There is no need for the state-chip mechanism from Remark 3.3.
Remark 4.2. We now briefly read through the code:
1. address is an address for the Issuer. It is payable (it can receive ether) and
public (its value can be read by any other function on the blockchain).13
2. constructor is the function initialising the contract. It gives issuer (who trig-
gers the contract) all the new token.
3. send is a function to send money to another address. Note that this is not
in the Plutus code; this is because we got it ‘for free’ as part of Cardano’s
in-built support for currencies (this is also why Idealised EUTxO has the
type Value in Figure 1).
4. buy on line 20 is analogue to the Buy transition in Figure 2.
4.2 Discussion
Remark 4.3. In line 21 of Figure 9 we calculate the tokens purchased using a
division of value (the total sum paid) by price .
In contrast, in line 29 of Figure 2 we calculate the sum by multiplying the
number of tokens by the price of each token.
13 Any data on the Ethereum blockchain is public in the external sense that it can be
read off the binary data of the blockchain as a file on a machine running it. However,
not all data is public in the internal sense that it can be accessed from any code
running on the Ethereum virtual machine.
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Sender = FunctionName = ContractName = Datum = Value = N
Transaction = ContractName× FunctionName× Sender× Value× Datum
Contract = ContractName× fin(Function)
Function ⊆ FunctionName×
(
(Sender× Value× Datum)→ Blockchain→ Blockchain
)
Blockchain = Contract
fin
⇀ (Value× Datum)
Fig. 8. Types for Idealised Ethereum
1 contract Changing {
2 address payable public issuer ; // issues the token
3 uint public price ; // current price
4 mapping (address ⇒ uint) public balances ; // tracks who owns how many tokens
5
6 constructor (uint count, uint price ) public {
7 require ( count > 0, ”count must be positive ”);
8 require ( price > 0, ”price must be positive ”);
9 issuer = msg.sender;
10 price = price ;
11 balances [msg.sender] = count;
12 }
13
14 function send(address receiver , uint amount) public {
15 require ( amount ≤ balances [msg.sender ], ”balance too low”);
16 balances [msg.sender] −= amount;
17 balances [ receiver ] += amount;
18 }
19
20 function buy() public payable {
21 uint tokens =msg.value / price ;
22 require ( tokens ≤ balances [ issuer ], ”not enough tokens”);
23 issuer . transfer (msg.value);
24 balances [ issuer ] −= tokens;
25 balances [msg.sender] += tokens;
26 }
27
28 function setPrice (uint newPrice) public {
29 require (msg.sender == issuer , ”only issuer can set price ”);
30 price = newPrice;
31 }
32 }
Fig. 9. Solidity implementation of the tradable coin
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There is a reason for this: we cannot perform the multiplication in the Solidity
buy code because we do not actually know the price per token at the time the
function acts to transition the blockchain. We can access a price at the time of
invoking buy by querying Changing.price (), but by the time that invocation reaches
the Ethereum blockchain and acts on it, the blockchain might have undergone
transitions, and the price might have changed.
Because Ethereum is stateful and has nothing like Remark 2.16 and Theo-
rem 2.17, this cannot be fixed.
Remark 4.4. One might counter that this could indeed be fixed, just by chang-
ing buy to include an extra parameter which is the price that the buyer expects to
pay, and if this expectation is not met then the function terminates. However, the
issuer controls the contract ( issuer=msg.sender on line 9 of Figure 9), including
the code for buy, so this safeguard can only exist at the issuer’s discretion—and
our issuer, whether through thoughtlessness or malice, has not included it.
In Cardano the buyer has more control, because by Theorem 2.17 a party
issuing a transaction knows (up to observational equivalence) precisely what the
inputs and outputs will be; the only question is whether it successfully attaches
to the blockchain (cf. Remark 2.16 and Subsection 2.3).
Another subtle error in the Ethereum code is that the / on line 21 is integer
division, so there may be a rounding error.14
Remark 4.5. The Ethereum code contains two errors, but the emphasis of this
discussion is not that it is possible to write buggy code (which is always true)
rather, we draw attention to how and why the underlying accounts-based struc-
ture of Ethereum invites and provides cover for certain errors in particular.
On the other hand, the Plutus code is more complex than the Ethereum
code. Plutus is arguably conceptually beautiful, but the pragmatics as currently
implemented are fiddly and the amount of boilerplate required to get our Plutus
contract running much exceeds that required for our Ethereum contract. This
may improve as Plutus matures and libraries improve—Plutus was streamlined
as this paper was written, in at least one instance because of a suggestion from
this paper15—but it remains to be seen if the gap can be totally closed.
So Ethereum is simple, direct and alluring, but can be dangerous, whereas
Plutus places higher burdens on the programmer but enjoys some good mathe-
matical properties which can enhance programmability. This is the tradeoff.
Remark 4.6 (Contracts on the blockchain). It is convenient to call the
code referred to in Figures 2 and 9 contracts, but this is in fact an imprecise
use of the term: a contract is an entity on the blockchain, whereas the figures
14 It would be unheard of for such elementary mistakes to slip into production code;
and even if it did happen, it is hardly conceivable that such errors would happen
repeatedly across a wide variety of programming languages.
That was sarcasm, but the point may bear repeating: programmer error and pro-
gramming language design are two sides of a single coin.
15 —the need for runGuardedStep.
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describe schemas or programs which, when invoked with parameters, attempt
to push a contract onto the blockchain.
– For Plutus, each time we invoke the contract schema for some choice of val-
ues for Config, the schema tries to creates a transaction on the blockchain
which generates a UTxO which carries a state-chip and an instance of the
contract. The contract is encoded in the monetary policy of the state-chip
(which enforces linearity once created) and in the Validator of that UTxO.
The issuer’s address is encoded in the Validator field of the UTxO. A math-
ematical presentation of the data structures concerned is in Figure 1.
– For Ethereum, Figure 9 also describes a schema which deploys a contract to
the blockchain. Each time we invoke its constructor we generate a specific
instance of Changing. Configuration data, given by the constructor arguments,
is simply stored as values of the global state variables of that instance, such
as issuer (line 2 of Figure 9).
Remark 4.7 (State & possible refinements). In Solidity, state is located
in variables in contracts. To query a state we just query a variable in a contract
of interest, e.g. price or balances in contract Changing in Figure 9.
In Plutus, state can be more expensive. State is located in unspent outputs;
see the Datum and Value fields in Output in Figure 1. In a transaction that
queries or modifies state, we consume any UTxOs containing state to which we
refer, and produce new UTxOs with new state. Even if our queries are read-only,
they destroy the UTxOs read and create new UTxOs.16
Suppose a UTxO contains some popular state information, so multiple users
submit transactions referencing it. Only one transaction can succeed and be
appended and the other transactions will not link to the new state UTxO which
is generated—even if it contains the same state data as the older version. Instead,
the other transactions will fail, because the particular incarnation of the state
UTxO to which they happened to link, has been consumed.
This could become a bottleneck. In the specific case of our Plutus contract,
it could become a victim of its own success if our token is purchased with high
enough frequency, since access to the state UTxO and the tokens on it could be-
come contested and slow and expensive in user’s time. The state UTxO becomes,
in effect, constantly locked by competing users—though note the the blockchain
would still be behaving correctly in the sense that nobody can lose tokens.
For a more scaleable scenario, some library for parallel redundancy with
a monetary policy for the state chip(s) implementing a consensus or merging
algorithm, might be required. This is future work.
One more small refinement: every token ever bought must go through the
contract at the official price—even if it is the issuer trying to withdraw it (recall
from Definition 1.1(4) that we allow only one issuance). In practice, the issuer
might want to code a way to get their tokens out without going through buy.
16 This is distinct from a user inspecting the contents of UTxOs from outside the
blockchain, i.e. by reading state off the hard drive of their node or Cardano wallet.
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Remark 4.8 (Resisting DOS attacks). An aside contrasting how Cardano
and Ethereum manage fees to prevent denial-of-service (DOS) attacks: In Car-
dano, users add transactions to the blockchain for a fee of a + bx where a and
b are constants and x is the size of the transaction in bytes. This prevents DOS
attacks because e.g. if we flood the blockchain with n transactions containing
tiny balances, we pay ≥ na in fees. In Ethereum, storage costs a fee (denomi-
nated in gas); if we inflate balances—which is a finite but unbounded mapping
from addresses to integers—with n tiny balances, we may run out of gas.
4.3 Summary of the critical points
1. The errors in the Solidity code are not necessarily obvious.
2. The errors cannot be defended against without rewriting the contract, which
requires the seller’s cooperation (who controls the contract and might even
have planted the bug).
3. In Plutus, the buyer creates a transaction and determines its inputs and
outputs. A transaction might be rejected if the available UTxOs change—
but if it succeeds then the buyer knows the outcome. Thus if the user of
a contract anticipates an error (or attack) then they can guard against it
independently of the contract’s designer.
In Ethereum this is impossible: a buyer can propose a transition to the global
virtual machine by calling a function on the Ethereum blockchain, but the
designer of the contract designed that function—and because of concurrency,
the buyer cannot know the values of the inputs to this function at the time
of its execution on the blockchain.
5 Conclusions
We hope this paper will provide a precise yet accessible entry point for interested
readers, and a useful guide to some of the design considerations in this area.
We have seen that Ethereum is an accounts-based blockchain system whereas
Cardano (like Bitcoin) is UTxO-based, and we have implemented a specification
(Definition 1.1) in Solidity (Section 4) and in Plutus (Section 3), and we have
given a mathematical abstraction of Cardano, idealised EUTxO (Section 2).
These have raised some surprisingly non-trivial points, both quite mathematical
(e.g. Subsection 2.3) and more implementational (e.g. Subsection 4.2), which are
discussed in the body of the paper.
The accounts-based paradigm lends itself to an imperative programming
style: a smart contract is a program that manipulates a global state mapping
global variables (‘accounts’) to values. The UTxO-based paradigm lends itself
to a functional programming style: the smart contract is a function that takes
a UTxO-list as its input, and returns a UTxO-list as its output, with no other
dependencies. See Theorem 2.17 and the preceding discussion and lemmas in
Subsection 2.2 for a mathematically precise rendering of this intuition, and Sub-
section 2.3 for supplementary results.
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Smart contracts are naturally concurrent and must expect to scale to thou-
sands, if not billions, of users,17 but the problems inherent to concurrent im-
perative programming are well-known and predate smart contracts by decades.
This is an issue with Ethereum/Solidity and it is visible even in our simple
example. Real-life examples, like the infamous DAO hack18, are clearly related
to the problem of transactions having unexpected consequences in a stateful,
concurrent environment.
Cardano’s UTxO-based structure invites a functional programming paradigm,
and this is reflected in Plutus. The price we pay is arguably an increase in concep-
tual complexity. More generally, in Remarks 4.6 and 4.7 we discussed how state
is handled in Plutus and its UTxO model: further clarification of the interaction
of state with UTxOs is important future work.
In summary: accounts are easier to think about than UTxOs, and imperative
programs are easier to read than functional programs, but this ease of use makes
us vulnerable to new classes of errors, especially in a concurrent safety-critical
context. Such trade-offs may be familiar to many readers with a computer science
or concurrency background.
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